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IT Is LATER THAN You THINK. By Max Lerner. New York: The Viking
Press, 1938. Pp. 260. $2.50.
SAvE A IERIcA FIRST. By Jerome Frank. New York: Harper and Brothers,
1938. Pp. 432. $3.75.
DARE WE LOOK AHEAD? By Bertrand Russell, Vernon Bartlett, G. D. H.
Cole, Sir Stafford Cripps, Herbert Morrison and Harold J. Laski. New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Pp. 190. $2.00.
NEARLY a hundred years ago John Stuart Mill pointed out that there are
two problems in economics, production and distribution, and that while in
the former we are dealing primarily with natural resources, the latter is
purely a matter of human intelligence. The delay in solving it has resulted
in the major issue now before the world. While democracy advanced as a
political way of life, it conspicuously failed to penetrate the economic sphere,
and of this failure we have become dangerously conscious in view of the
immense progress of the last half century in the control of natural forces.
These three books reflect this consciousness. 'Mr. Lerner strikes a common
note in pointing out the paradox of "the technique, lying at hand for us to
use, of planning for a stable and abundant economy, and the technique we
seem determined to follow of distributing ever less wealth, with ever greater
friction." All three recognize the decay of capitalism and the danger to
democratic institutions implicit in the challenge of Communism on the one
hand, and Fascism on the other. All three find the way of defense in an
offensive on the part of the democratic majority, but do not minimize the
lengths to which the possessing minority will go to preserve their economic
overlordship. And all outline this defense in terms of economic planning.
Mr. Lerner finds the historical cause of the delay in fulfilling the democratic
hope of economic amelioration in the ambiguous doctrine of liberalism which
allowed the capitalists to convert it "from a credo for freeing the oppressed
into a code for keeping them in their places." But the place of the workers
is no longer that of mere producers; they are necessary as consumers to the
fulfilling of the economic process, and to be consumers they must have pur-
chasing power, if not in the form of wages then in that of relief. To secure
a stable equilibrium between production and consumption, especially to employ
the machinery of production to effect that possible economy of abundance, of
which we have become aware, requires economic planning. In Mr. Lerner's
view such planning would result in a democratic collectivism or state capi-
talism. "Private property and private industrial initiative would remain, but
capitalists could make their large decisions on policy only within a frame-
work set by planning boards." To achieve this supremacy of plan over chaos
the incentive would be the determination to expand the national income
through "gearing the major economic processes together."
Mr. Lerner is not entirely optimistic as to our ability to arrive at this result
in view of our experience with the most ambitious effort in this direction,
the New Deal. He analyzes the intellectual outlook of this enterprise into
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nine different schools of thought, and concludes sadly that "after more than
six years in power, it has not made up its mind as to the goal toward which
it is travelling and the means by which it hopes to arrive." Nor does he
underestimate the opposition of the capitalists to the loss of power to do as
they like with their own, an opposition particularly powerful in a democracy
through their control of "the principal channels for influencing mass opinion,
which have become virtually a class monopoly." There is, moreover, always
the possibility of invoking terror, through government officials and vigilantes,
as in the "little steel" strikes in 1937. There is finally the alternative of
Fascism, which makes the intelligent element in the majority fearful of
pressing its rational program lest capitalism invoke this last resource in the
class struggle.
On the other hand it may be assumed that in view of the discrepancy
between production and consumption capitalism without planning cannot sur-
vive, and in the choice of instruments of planning intelligent capitalists who
themselves have been habituated to respect the democratic theory may choose
the democratic machinery. Moreover, the economics of Fascism, as exem-
plified in Italy and Germany, are rotten. It has met the problem of under-
consumption and unemployment by inculcating a frantic nationalism expressed
in armament. "Remove the pressure for armaments and you remove the
underpinning of the economy and precipitate bankruptcy." From war the
Fascists shrink because it will lead to Communist revolution, and yet war
is imminent in the collapse of armament economics. The remedy for the
democracies is the cordon sanitaire, which is not adopted "because of fear
and short-sightedness." In short the same faults mark democracy in the field
of foreign as in that of domestic policy. The vice of democracy is inertia.
It must be roused to militancy in its own defense, for its own survival.
Mr. Lerner states his conditions for the survival of democracy chiefly in
spiritual terms. His practical agenda for expanding our economy are sketched
as the selection of twenty or thirty basic industries, an estimate of the con-
sumption schedules for their product, at prices to yield a tolerable profit,
and the simultaneous stepping-up of production with guaranties by govern-
ment of both profits and wages. The banking and credit system will be
socialized, foreign trade controlled, and also the investment process. This
program is not different from that offered by Mr. Jerome Frank in Save
America First, except that Mr. Frank relies on the intelligent cooperative
action of capitalists rather than on government flat. He belongs to the school
of New Deal economists which Mr. Lerner describes as "regulatory", who
"are willing to use whatever government power is necessary to get capitalism
to function", but fear the resentment of capitalists if the power of making
basic economic decisions is taken from them, "who are collectivists without
the courage of Socialist convictions." It is government control rather than
regulation which makes possible the simultaneous fixing of production and
prices in all leading industries, which in Mr. Lerner's view, is the essential
of a planned economy.
Save America First lacks the forthright, athletic quality of Mr. Lerner's
book. It is wandering and repetitious with a good deal of irrelevant matter.
Mr. Frank's title suggests that he feels it his special mission to protect
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his fellow-countrymen against those misleaders of opinion who would have
them seek salvation abroad. Since our foreign trade has never amounted to
more than seven percent of our annual production of goods and services, and
we have an "unchangeable conviction" against letting it increase beyond the
modest limits of Mr. Hull's treaties (which Mr. Frank approves), it would
seem unnecessary to deal repeatedly with this man of straw. Of course Mr.
Frank's animadversions upon our practice of lending Europe money to buy
our goods, and failing to collect, are amply justified, but our meekness in
the face of this fraud would seem to work against his argument that foreign
trade tends to involve us in the political complications of other countries,
With what country are we in more danger of such involvement than with
Mexico, with which Mr. Frank thinks "we can and should trade"? Ile is
perfectly sound in arguing that "if we are to stay out of the next European
war, the only safe policy is to stay out of Europe's preparations for that
war." It might be supposed then that to shorten sail in foreign trade we
should begin with embargoes upon supplies for war to nations who are threat-
ening the peace of the world and our own. To the advocates of this policy
Mr. Frank imputes a sinister intention of leading America into war, similar
to the obscene purpose of radicals in increasing our foreign commerce "to
make more certain the downfall of our economic system and paving the way
for Communism."
Mr. Frank says, by the way, a number of interesting and important things.
He regards a unit of continental dimensions as necessary for the well-being
and security of the people in a world of international anarchy, and he blames
Great Britain more than once for the selfish malevolence with which she
frustrated the statesmanlike plan of Napoleon for a European continental
system. He is acute in his criticism of the Marxist view of history as abso-
lutely determined, without due regard to the "accidents". Suppose Seward
had been nominated in place of Lincoln, or Booth's pistol had missed fire?
Of course these examples merely refer causation to an earlier stage; but some
of Mr. Frank's illustrations from the history of the New Deal are more
apt to his purpose, and confirm Mr. Lerner's characterization of that experi-
ment.
Mr. Frank believes that in place of foreign trade we should strive to
increase the domestic market for goods, through distribution of purchasing
power. He accepts the description of our economy as potentially one of
abundance, and considers that its failure is largely a matter of industrial
sabotage on the part of the capitalists, who leave part of the plant idle by
reducing purchasing power through cutting wages and raising prices. But
this process is not inevitable. We need not turn to Communism or to govern-
ment control for its correction. "If we are an intelligent people, we can
instead rely upon a modification and supplementation of our present profit
system."
He fears that to deprive the "powerful few" of their authority, even more
than of their property, could not be accomplished without violence. Ile there-
fore trusts that "the - can be led to adapt themselves to an economy of abund-
ance by inducing them, for their own selfish good, to accept new habits and
customs." To assist this wished-for consummation he proposes consultation
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among representatives of key industries, steel men with automobile, machinery,
and building men, and these in turn with customers, to ascertain howv much,
with lower prices all along the line, their sales can be increased. This would
be not unlike the N.R.A. with, however, the definite objective of increasing
production. Like Mr. Lerner he would have government guarantee industry
against loss as the result of increasing production and lowering prices. He
overlooks the importance of simultaneous and concerted action in all key
industries which to Mr. Lerner is so important. Nevertheless he would enlarge
the function of government in business. After all it is government which gives
vitality to the legal rights of those who operate our economy. Should it not
then "more consciously and more responsibly seek to guide and to supple-
ment those powers which it has heretofore left (with little or no accompanying
obligations to the public) to those who control our major industrial enter-
prises ?" The cautious style of this proposition measures the difference between
Mr. Frank and Mr. Lerner.
Dare We Look Ahead is made up of six lectures delivered before the
Fabian Society in 1937. Its chief interest in this discussion is the bearing of
the several essays upon the theses of the Americans. Mr. Cole emphasizes
the economic dislocation resulting from war preparation. Sir Stafford Cripps
declares roundly that "the economic aims and objectives of Fascism do not
differ essentially from those of democratic capitalism. In both cases it is
essential to maintain authoritarian government by a privileged minority."
And he decries the idea that a combination of progressive forces will "accom-
plish the effective economic change that is essential if democracy is to survive,
since there is in fact no common basis for any positive action.' The alternative
would seem to be revolution; but Mr. Herbert Morrison warns against up-
setting "the stability of the social order and the capitalist financial system."
Socialism will have to come in orderly fashion or the finish will be Fascism.
Mr. Harold J. Laski, like Mr. Lerner, points out that the momentous nature
of the change in social constitution will "disturb vested interests whose ac-
ceptance of democratic institutions is contingent upon their relation to those
interests", and will therefore put a strain on the toleration of civil liberties.
Privileged classes in the democratic countries will regard the challenge to
their position in much the same light as did those classes in Russia and
Spain. Moreover, "we have no longer the leeway in the economic realm
which enabled continuous concessions to be made to the working class without
any effective alteration in the position of the privileged."
These three books cannot be described as optimistic in regard to the social
outlook. Even Mr. Frank's faith in the intelligence of the capitalists is over-
shadowed by his own account of the persistence of industrial sabotage and
the follies of financial capitalism during the war and after. All three books
are written with a sense of urgency reflected in the titles. The question in
each is: Can we accomplish the necessary and inevitable changes in our
economy without civil war? On the other hand there is a general opinion that
international war on a world scale will be avoided. Mr. Lerner believes that
the Fascists fear war more than anything except freedom of thought. Mr.
Vernon Bartlett in his lecture on "The War Horizon" believes that "these
dictators who so terrify our Government are not nearly so dangerous as they
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sound." And yet the menace of civil war invariably suggests the alternative
of foreign war, especially to irresponsible dictators who have made their
appeal to nationalism. On the whole it cannot be said that the outlook for
democracy and the civilization which it connotes is one to inspire confidence.
ROBERT MORSS LovTTt
New York City.
TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT BONDHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES. THE IMMUNITY
RULE AND THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT. A Study by the Department of
Justice. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1938. Pp. Xi, 219.
A GREAT many people, I suppose, write reviews of books which they
haven't bothered to read, but it is not the general custom to preface such a
review with such a confession. Well, I haven't read the Department of Jus-
tice's 219-page report on taxation of government bondholders and employees,
entitled "The Immunity Rule and the Sixteenth Amendment." I haven't
read it because I know pretty well what's in it without reading it-and by
that I do not imply either discredit to its authors or credit to myself. I'm
sure that Messrs. Morris, Key, Buck, and Gardner of the Department have
turned out a capable legal report. I'm sure that anyone who knows anything
about income tax law also knows pretty well what that report contains. Or
could find out the way I found out. I did read the table of contents.
Here is the story. The President decides it's high time that people who
hold government bonds or jobs began to pay state and federal income taxes
on them, just as do people who hold private bonds or jobs. The only reason
they haven't paid up to now is a series of rickety Supreme Court rulings
stemming from Justice Marshall's much misconstrued and misquoted dictum
that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." So the President,
wisely scorning a constitutional amendment (which the Court, after all, could
twist just as blithely as it has twisted the Sixteenth), calls for legislation
waiving the immunity of federal salaries and bonds from state income taxes,
and proclaiming the power of the federal income tax to reach state and
city salaries and bonds. Unquestionably the first part would hold legal water.
If Congress wants to waive it can waive and the Supreme Court can't stop
it. But those antique buggies-without-horses, Pollock v. Parviers Loan and
Trust Co. and Collector v. Day, still stand in the road of the second part.
So the President asks the Hon. H. Cummings for legal support. The Hon.
H. Cummings asks the Hon. H. Oliphant (General Counsel, Treasury De-
partment). The Hon. H. Oliphant asks Messrs. Morris (Assistant Attor-
ney General) et al. (Special Assistants to the Attorney General). And
Messrs. Morris et al. produce a 219-page report.
It is, of course, written in legal language, restrained, respectful, thickly
annotated-and apparently emanating, as do all legal arguments, from an
tEditor, The New Republic.
[Vol. 48
REVIEWS
unsaid assumption that this is a tough objective problem on which objective
men must put their objective minds, solemnly. It marshals, in full detail, all
the old contentions, precedential, logical, historical, to the effect that the
Court has been misguided in following the immunity rule and that it should
therefore mend its error. (I haven't read the report, remember, so stop me
if I'm wrong). It divides the old contentions into two types-thuse based on
the law before the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, and those based on
four little words of the Amendment itself. It adds to the second group of
contentions voluminous "new" material to prove that "from whatever source
derived" was originally intended to mean "from whatever source derived."
It nuzzles up to the present memberslip of the Court by citing a couple of
decisions from the last term which "modify" the immunity rule. Its sum
and substance could be contained in a three-word plea :-"Wise up, boys."
How, then, will the story go on? A bill, flouting the immunity nle, will
be introduced in Congress. It will pass, not because it is backed by a solid
legal document, but because it will have heavy popular support. Next, some
previously untaxed holder of state bonds or a state job will hire a lawyer.
The lawyer will marshal all the old arguments as to why the new law is un-
constitutional just as painstakingly as 'Messrs. Morris et al. marshalled the
arguments on the other side. He will carry his protest up to the Supreme
Court. And what will happen then? Why, then the nine men who make up
the Court will decide whether the immunity rule should be discarded just as
a majority of them please to decide it-and just as they would have decided
it if Messrs. Lorris et al. had never written their 219-page report. Except
that if they decide in favor of the government, they may swipe some material
from the report (which by that time will be embalmed in a briefI to use in
their opinion.
And don't for a minute suppose that the President and the Hon. H. Cum-
mings and the Hon. H. Oliphant and the rest don't know this. Here is the
pay-off. The legislation recommended by the President would include a pro-
vision that the interest on all federal bonds issued in the future be subjected
to the federal income tax. That, along with the other provisions, would leave
just, one type of government income still not subject to the federal income
tax. The lone type of income thus left immune would be none other than the
salaries of federal judges, including the Honorable members of the Supreme
Court. And those salaries were put out of the reach of the federal tax col-
lector by a Supreme Court decision far more flagrant in its distortion of the
Constitution than Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. or Collector v.
Day.
Maybe the omission was an oversight. Maybe. Still, I can't help wonder-
ing whether that oversight won't carry more weight with certain members
of the Court than 219 pages-worth of legal argument.
FnED RODELLf
New Haven, Conn.
Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROL'ERTY
INCLUDING COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES. By Stephen P. Ladas.
New York: Macmillan, 1938. 2 vols. Pp. xlix, 679; ix, 594. $8.50.
PRESENT-DAY circumstances make a book on the subject of the international
protection of literary and artistic property timely. It is bound to receive
the attention of lawyers representing composers, authors, publishers, radio
broadcasters, motion picture producers and exhibitors, manufacturers of
phonograph records, electrical transcriptions and player-piano rolls, proprie-
tors of dance-halls, and night clubs, the embryonic television industry and
hosts of others whose principal source of profit is obtained from the ex-
ploitation of copyrighted musical, literary, artistic or other works of an
intellectually creative nature. Many of these industries are international in
scope. All use works written or composed by authors living throughout the
world. This is particularly true in the case of music, which does not know
the barriers of language.
Mr. Ladas devotes Volume 1 to a discussion of his theory of copyright
protection, the history of international copyright, the structure of the Berne
Convention and a discussion of certain phases of copyright law as interpreted
by the courts of continental Europe, with only occasional reference to British
and American decisions. Part 3 of Volume 1 gives the history and struc-
ture of the Inter-American Conventions. Volume 2 devotes less than 200
pages to a discussion of the copyright law of the United States, 35 pages
to the copyright law of the British Empire, 60 pages to the copyright law of
Latin America, 150 pages to the law of other countries, and 90 pages to
the text of the Berne Convention and its various modifications, the several
Pan-American Conventions and the United States Copyright Act. A brief
bibliography is given which unfortunately makes no reference to articles and
student contributions in the several law reviews. The index is far from satis-
factory. It contains no reference to such important subjects as "renewal
rights," the "term of copyright," copyright in "ideas," "pleading," "evidence,"
"novelty" or "originality" of subject matter, "injunction," "employer and
employee," and many other subjects which are given prominence in the in-
dices of most works on copyright. Moreover, Mr. Ladas does not mention in
his index any of the authors whose works are frequently referred to in
the text.
A discussion of the law of continental Europe and the citation of cases is
a distinct contribution to the field of copyright literature 'because the books
heretofore written in the English language have concentrated on the law and
the decisions in English speaking countries with only an occasional reference
to the law and its interpretation in other nations. The foreign cases cited
by Mr. Ladas, however, omit all reference to the official reports. Even the
names of the cases are not given, the sole citation being to Droit D'Aluteur.
The author misses another opportunity in failing to correlate the law of
the various countries. There is no attempt to compare the copyright law of
the United States with the copyright law of other countries, to cite foreign
cases on questions which have not yet been decided by the United States
courts, and to show those respects in which the copyright laws of all coun-
tries are substantially identical so that the decisions of one country may be
treated as precedents in another country in cases of first impression.
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MNr. Ladas' ideas as to the nature of copyright are not in accord with the
progressive theories developed over the years since copyright was first rec-
ognized as a form of property. In his very first paragraph, he explains that
"the use of the word 'property' in the title of this study in connection with
authors' rights in literary and artistic works does not imply that the writer
accepts the juristic theory which conceives of such rights as property rights"
(p. 1). On the contrary, he argues that copyright is not property for many
reasons: the copyright is not perpetual; the author is not given the exclusive
right of enjoyment of its object; upon the publication of a work, the crea-
tion to which the copyright attaches becomes common to all; in a case of
transfer of copyright, certain rights, the moral rights, are always retained
by the afithor; certain modes of acquisition of property, such as prescrip-
tion, accession and adverse possession are inapplicable to copyright; property
is governed by the law of the place where it is located, while copyright is
governed generally by the law of the place where protection is sought (pp.
7-8). The author then concludes that since copyright is not "property" the
legal relations resulting from the ownership of a copyright must be deter-
mined "by the weighing of the interests that these rights purport to secure
in the whole scheme of interests that the law seeks to satisfy and protect.
In this connection the interests of users of the authors' creations and the
social interest in the advancement of culture or the progress of arts and let-
ters are to be considered" (p. 12).
Against the background of these conclusions, the author proceeds to rec-
ommend theories and legislation which would strike a serious blow at the
objects sought to be accomplished by the framers of our Constitution when
they drafted Article 1, Section 8-namely, to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts. The author prefers the notions of copyright now pre-
vailing in Germany and Italy to those of France (pp. 5-6).
It is impossible in a short review to analyze at length the conclusions which
Mr. Ladas draws from the fallacious premise that copyright is not property.
Briefly, however, he concludes that since copyright is a "personal right" and
not "property," the author holds his rights at the whim and the caprice of
the legislature, and that copyright legislation should be enacted as much for
the immediate benefit of the user of copyrighted works as for the author who
creates them. Apparently, MIr. Ladas would admit this theory to be unsound
if copyright really were property. The test he applies certainly is not deter-
minative of that question. It is absurd to argue that copyright is not "prop-
erty" because it cannot be acquired by prescription, accession or adverse pos-
session. Who ever heard of acquiring an interest in a corporation by any of
these means? Imagine anyone claiming that he acquired certain shares of
stock by adverse possession for more than 20 Years of certificates evidencing
ownership l Or similar acquisition of a promissory note without obtaining the
endorsement of the payee. Yet no one can deny that the shareholder in the one
case, or the payee in the other have very definite property rights.
Does copyright lose the attribute of "property" because it is not perpetual?
So-called "common-law copyright" (which is a misnomer because the exclusive
right to make copies arises only upon securing statutory copyright) is per-
petual. Publication is a dedication of all common law rights. As long as
the work remains in its unpublished state and no statutory copyright has
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been secured, the author's common-law rights are perpetual.1 Statutory copy-
right, however, exists only for limited periods of time, except in Portugal,
where it is perpetual. 2 But limitation of the term of property rights in
intangibles is not uncommon. If the payee of a note fails to sue the maker
within six years after maturity he loses most of his rights.
The fact that a copyright owner is given some rights with respect to his
work but is denied others does not destroy the proprietary nature of his
interest. We are all familiar with laws denying to owners of real estate the
right to erect billboards, or to build stores in neighborhoods restricted under
zoning laws. The terms and conditions under which owners of corporate
shares can dispose of this form of property under rules laid down by the
S. E. C. materially limit the exercise of rights in that form of *property.
Owners of railroads and factories cannot operate their respective facilities or
plants except in a manner prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion or by the National Labor Relations Board. All property rights in choses
in action may be destroyed by the obligor's discharge in bankruptcy.
Under our law, all rights granted to copyright owners must be exclusive.0
What can be more definitely a "property" right than one in which exclusive-
ness is guaranteed under the federal constitution? The "compulsory license"
feature of our Copyright Law, under which all manufacturers of records
may appropriate the author's musical works on paying two cents for each
record manufactured regardless of the merit of the work, is the only instance
where a right granted to American copyright owners is not exclusive,4 and
all reliable authors of treatises on copyright law have universally branded this
"compulsory license" provision as unconstitutional.,
Apparently the author claims that copyright is not "property" because
"upon publication of a work, the creation to which the copyright attaches
becomes common to all" (p. 7). That is not the law in any civilized coun-
try of the world. Publication is not a "dedication" or "abandonment" of
property rights in the work undess the author fails or refieses to secure statu-
tory copyright. The purpose of all copyright statutes as well as of our con-
stitutional provision is to secure rights to authors after publication. Common
law rights adequately protect authors before publication. Equally unsound
is the claim that "property . . . may be fully ceded and assigned, while in
a case of transfer of [copyright], certain rights, the moral rights, are always
retained by the author" (p. 7).6 The so-called moral right is entirely inde-
1. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912) ; Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872).
2. LADAS, 1081.
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, Sec. 8, CI. 8.
4. 17 U. S. C. § 1 (e) (1934).
5. Even Mr. Ladas agrees that this provision is of questionable constitutionality.
6. The "moral right" is recognized and defined as follows in Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention as revised at Rome in 1928:
. "(1) Independently of the patrimonial rights of the author, and even
after the assignment of the said rights, the author retains the right to claim
the paternity of the work, as well as the right to object to every deforma-
tion, mutilation or other modification of the said work, which may be preju-
dicial to his honor or to his reputation.
"(2) It is left to the national legislation of each of the countries of the
Union to establish the conditions for the exercise of these rights. The meatis
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pendent of copyright. It is a personal right similar to the right of privacy.
The copyright laws of the United States and England do not recognize this
moral right.8 The fact that some countries recognize a moral right in the
author in addition to his copyright certainly cannot detract from the pro-
prietary nature of the copyright itself.
It is to be regretted that a work which so ably presents the copyright law
of continental Europe and the historical development of international copy-
right should be marred by a discussion of domestic copyright and the theories




DIPLOMATIc CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. INTER-AMERIcAN
AFFAIRS, 1831-1860. Selected and arranged by William R. Manning. Vol.
X, THE NETHERLANDS, PARAGUAY, PERU. Washington: Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 1938. Pp. xxxvii, 913.
CONFERENCIAS INTERNACIONALES AMERICANAS, 1809-1936. RECOrILAC0IN
DE LOS TRATADos, CONVENCIONES, RECOMENDACIONES, RESOLUCIONES Y
MOCIONEs ADOPTADAS POR LAS SIETE PRIMERAS CONFERENCIAS INTERNA-
CIONALES AmERICANAS, LA CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA DE
CONCILIAcI 6 N Y ARBITRAJE Y LA CONFERENCIA INTERAMERICANA DE COI-
SOLIDACI6N DE LA PAZ; CON VARIos Docu.IENTOS RELAITIVOS A LA OR-
GANIZACI6N DE LAS REFERIDAS CONFERENCIAS. Prefacio por Leo S. Rowe.
Introducci6n por James Brown Scott. Washington: Dutaci6n Carnegie
para la Paz Internacional, 1938. Pp. lviii, 746.
No ONE seems to know how to preserve peace or how to secure a real un-
derstanding between peoples but it may be safely asserted that, if these poten-
tial blessings ever become a reality in the Americas, the work of tie Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace will have helped to achieve it. The two
works listed above constitute only a small portion of the vast amount of pub-
lished material that the Endowment has made available on the international
relations of the American states.
The first volume noted is number ten in the series of substantial volumes
Dr. William R. 'Manning has edited for the Endowment on inter-American
for safeguarding them shall be regulated by the legislation of the country
where protection is daimed."
7. Cf. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 H,%v. L. Rcv. 193,
cited by Ladas at p. 4.
8. LADAS, 802.
ember of the New York and Connecticut Bars.
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affairs. The documents relating to the Netherlands and Paraguay are of
relatively minor importance and the bulk of the correspondence is devoted
to our relations with Peru. Among the subjects treated are the efforts of
the United States to obtain a treaty with Peru containing the most-favored-
nation clause, our dispute with Peru regarding the sovereignty of Peru over
the Lobos Islands, and the dispute concerning the free navigation of the
Amazon River. In view of the recent conference at Lima, it is interesting
to observe that in 1846 President Castilla enquired of the United States con-
sul at Lima whether the "Governm't of the U. States would lend itself to
oppose this iniquitous attempt on the part of the Monarchies of Europe
[General Flores' threatened invasion of Peru, supposedly with the conniv-
ance of England, France, and Spain] to Subvert the principles and Repub-
lican form of governm't existing in South America." Castilla wanted to buy
United States warships and the consul believed that this "would be a ser-
vice to the cause of Republicanism and of Humanity."
The second work is a translation in Spanish of the volume issued in 1931
entitled International Conferences of American States, i889-1928, with
additional material covering the Montevideo conference of 1933. It consti-
tutes, as the title indicates, a complete record of the formal acts of the first
seven American conferences and is therefore an indispensable work of ref-
erence for all students of the international relations of the Americas. In one
sense, however, this volume may be considered a museum of pious hopes,
for many of the proposals agreed upon have never been carried out. Resolu-
tions have been passed on sanitation, finance, education, bibliography,
cultural relations, women's rights, functions of the Pan American Union,
labor, arbitration, and aviation-to name only a few of the subjects consid-
ered at one time or another since Secretary Blaine called the first conference
in Washington in 1889-but not always have these decisions been put into
effect. One is reminded of the flourish with which Spanish officials used to
receive a royal decree in America-obed6zcase pero no se cumple: let it be
obeyed but not enforced.
Valuable as this formal record is, it needs to be used in conjunction with
the day-to-day discussions as shown in the minutes of the various confer-
ences. Only thus can we appreciate the attitude of the various nations to the
individual resolutions. A steady increase in the time and realistic wisdom
devoted to cultural exchanges is a welcome sign. One of the most important
single documents in the volume is the convention on private international law
presented to the Sixth Conference at Havana in 1928 (pp. 302-350).
All in all, these two volumes demonstrate the faith held by Dr. James
Brown Scott, Director of the Division of International Law of the Carnegie
Endowment, which this reviewer shares, that any true understanding among
the Americas must be based upon the facts of their relationship.
LEwis HANKIt
Cambridge, Mass.
fInstructor in History, Harvard University.
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